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Abstract 
The paper explores processes of coalition governance in foreign policy. Specifically, it argues 
that such processes are being shaped by two interrelated dimensions of coalition set-ups: first, 
the allocation of the foreign ministry to the senior or a junior coalition partner; second, the 
degree of policy discretion which is delegated to that ministry. Bringing these two 
dimensions together, the paper distinguishes four types of coalition arrangements for the 
making of foreign policy which are expected to have predictable implications for the process 
of foreign policy making and ultimately for the foreign policy outputs and quality of 
multiparty coalitions. 
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Existing research on coalition foreign policy has focused more on the foreign policy outputs 
of coalition governments than on the process of foreign policy decision making inside 
coalitions (Kaarbo and Beasley, 2008). In particular, early scholarship in the field has for the 
most part assumed a dichotomy between single-party and coalition governments and that 
coalition foreign policy-making exhibits certain fixed characteristics (see also the 
contribution to this symposium by Oktay and Beasley). What previous works have largely 
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failed to acknowledge is that coalition governments may organise differently for the making 
of foreign policy. Different processes of foreign policy making in coalition governments, in 
turn, should be expected to have a differential impact on the foreign policy outputs of 
coalitions. 
 
This expectation links in with long-established findings in comparative research on cabinet 
government that the distinction between single-party and coalition cabinets has less impact on 
many aspects of government decision-making than the differences that exist between 
different configurations of coalition government (Frognier, 1993). Opening up the ‘black 
box’ of coalition governance in foreign affairs, therefore, promises more fine-grained insights 
into the drivers and characteristics of coalition foreign policy. Since executives tend to have a 
freer hand in foreign policy than in public policy, which is at the focus of most comparative 
politics research into coalition governance, understanding intra-coalition dynamics of policy-
making is arguably even more relevant in foreign affairs. 
 
Along these lines, the objective of the article is to provide conceptual starting points for a 
research agenda in coalition foreign policy that puts the process of foreign policy making in 
coalition governments centre stage (Kaarbo, 2008) and that contributes to our understanding 
of coalition governance more generally which research into the different phases of the 
coalition life-cycle has often neglected (Müller and Strøm, 2000). Such an agenda also 
promises to shed new light on normative debates about the promise and problems of coalition 
government and the quality of coalition foreign policy. 
 
Specifically, the article suggests that processes of coalition governance in foreign policy are 
being shaped by two interrelated dimensions of coalition set-ups. The first dimension is about 
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which coalition partner is allocated the foreign ministry, in particular whether the ministry 
goes to the senior coalition partner or to a junior partner. The second dimension distinguishes 
between coalition governments in which foreign policy making is marked by significant 
policy discretion of the foreign minister and coalitions which put greater emphasis on 
centralised control mechanisms in foreign policy. Depending on the classification of coalition 
governments on these two dimensions, the foreign policy impact of coalition politics should 
be different.  
 
The article will first lay out the two dimensions of coalition configurations in foreign policy. 
Second, it will move on to discuss the implications of different types of coalition foreign 
policy making for the foreign policy outputs of coalitions. Third, the discussion will zoom in 
specifically on the links between the process of foreign policy making in coalition 
governments and the quality of coalition foreign policy. The article concludes with 
identifying promising avenues for further research into coalition governance in foreign policy. 
What should be noted, moreover, is that the theoretical argument proposed in this article has 
been largely developed from the experience with coalition governments in established 
parliamentary democracies in Western Europe. It will be worth exploring whether and to 
what extent our argument travels to coalition politics in non-Western contexts, in particular in 
the Global South (see also the contribution to this symposium by Nicolas Blarel and Niels 
van Willigen). 
 
 
COALITION ARRANGEMENTS FOR FOREIGN POLICY 
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By way of mapping different coalition configurations for the making of foreign policy, the 
consideration of two interrelated dimensions is critical. First, which coalition partner, the 
senior partner or a junior partner, holds the foreign ministry? Second, how much policy 
discretion does holding this ministry bring? 
 
The first key parameter of coalition sets-ups for foreign policy is the allocation of 
departments in the foreign policy executive (Hill, 1993) between the coalition partners 
(Hagan, 1993). Portfolio allocation is central to coalition formation since the control of 
government departments is the most immediate payoff for political parties from joining a 
coalition government (Browne and Franklin, 1973). While office-seeking parties covet 
cabinet portfolios intrinsically for the prestige and opportunity for patronage they bring, 
policy-seeking parties instrumentally value ministries as a means to shape government policy 
(Laver and Schofield, 1990; Druckman and Warwick, 2005). The negotiations between 
prospective coalition partners about the distribution of portfolios can usefully be understood 
as a two-stage process (see Budge and Keman, 1990). At the first stage, each partner lays 
claim to certain ministries. At the second stage, parties resolve competing claims by trading 
ministries and negotiate a weighted distribution of portfolios that is proportionate to the share 
of legislative seats each of them brings to the table. In practice, the two stages are intertwined 
in that parties will formulate their portfolio claims in anticipation of what they can 
realistically hope to get in view of their relative size and the portfolio preferences of their 
coalition partners. 
 
By far the most significant department in the foreign policy executive is the foreign ministry, 
which is the key source of diplomatic expertise within government and generally the lead 
department in foreign affairs. This ministry is also among the most highly considered prizes 
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of the coalition formation game and ranks as one of the most senior portfolios in any 
government (Laver and Schofield, 1990). As a case in point, respondents to a large-scale 
expert survey put the foreign ministry down as the second most important department in 21 
out of 24 Western democracies, behind the ministry of finance. The foreign ministry was 
among the top three departments in all countries under study and always the highest-ranked 
department within the foreign policy executive, ahead of portfolios such as defence, trade or 
international development (Laver and Hunt, 1992). A more recent expert survey in 14 
Western European countries found that the foreign office was on average the third most 
salient portfolio, behind the Prime Ministership and the ministry of finance (Druckman and 
Warwick, 2005). Accordingly, the foreign ministry is seen as one of only a small subset of 
portfolios which are salient enough to increase the public visibility of the party in charge and 
to affect its electoral prospects (Bueno de Mesquita, 1979). Coalition partners will therefore 
often have an eye on the foreign ministry when they negotiate the allocation of portfolios. 
 
What is more, which coalition party leads the foreign ministry is significant for the process of 
coalition foreign policy making. Specifically, the decision-making authority and formal 
jurisdiction over foreign policy as well as the bureaucratic resources and expertise that come 
with the department give the party in charge of the foreign ministry important agenda setting 
powers and informational advantages (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). The party which holds the 
foreign ministry should thus be in a privileged position to play a proactive role in shaping and 
initiating processes of coalition foreign policy making. Also, this party is likely to attain a 
high public profile in foreign policy and to have a strong political incentive to take the lead in 
coalition foreign policy making and to develop a reputation for issue ownership in the field 
(Petrocik, 1996). 
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At the same time, the very fact that a party has come to lead the foreign ministry will often 
indicate that it takes a particular interest in foreign affairs. Policy saliency theory suggests 
that the qualitative allocation of cabinet portfolios is driven by the relative salience coalition 
partners attribute to different policy dimensions (Laver and Hunt, 1992). This is because 
parties are interested, either intrinsically or instrumentally with a view towards their electoral 
prospects, to control coalition policy on the policy fields which they have emphasised most in 
their party platforms and which they have therefore become linked with in the public mind. 
At the first stage of coalition formation, parties will claim departments which have authority 
over the policy areas they consider most important relative to other policy areas. At the 
second stage, they will trade off portfolios on lower-salience policy dimensions against 
portfolios dealing with policies that are of higher salience to them. The foreign ministry 
should therefore go the coalition partner which attaches the greatest weight to foreign policy 
(Bäck et al, 2011). 
 
The party in charge of the foreign ministry can thus be expected to have both certain means 
and the political will to take a leading role in coalition foreign making. What is of particular 
significance, in this context, is whether the foreign ministry is held by the senior coalition 
partner, i.e., the party which fills the office of Prime Minister, or by a junior coalition partner 
which has fewer seats in parliament than the senior partner. First, control over the foreign 
ministry has been identified as one possible pathway for ideologically committed junior 
coalition partners to ‘hijack’ coalition foreign policy and push it into a more ‘extreme’ (i.e., 
more aggressive or more peaceful) direction (Kaarbo, 1996; Beasley and Kaarbo, 2014). 
Second, coalitions in which the foreign ministry and the Prime Minister’s office are held by 
different parties should display greater scope for intra-coalition conflict in foreign policy 
making than coalitions in which both positions are controlled by the senior partner. Moving 
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beyond the foreign ministry, the same logic suggests that foreign policy making is more 
conflictual in coalitions which have allocated the departments in the foreign policy executive 
to different parties than in coalitions in which these departments are held by the same 
coalition partner. 
 
Apart from the distribution of relevant ministries between the coalition partners, the second 
parameter of coalition foreign policy making is the extent of policy discretion which holding 
such departments brings. Given its pre-eminent position in the foreign policy executive, the 
focus is again on the foreign ministry. The key divide on this second dimension of coalition 
arrangements is between coalitions which are marked by ministerial government in foreign 
policy and those which give greater room to centralised control mechanisms in this field. 
 
At one end of the continuum, coalition governance rests on decentralised authority structures 
leaving individual ministries with large policy discretion. Under such an arrangement, 
coalition partners agree at the coalition formation stage to delegate policy-making authority 
within particular jurisdictions to the party in charge of the relevant portfolios. Cabinet 
ministers, including the foreign minister, can thus be understood as ‘policy dictators’ who 
have the capacity within their field of competence to tie coalition policy to their own and 
their party’s ideal points (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Along these lines, the foreign policy of 
coalitions which display strong patterns of ministerial government should be driven first and 
foremost by the preferences and priorities of the party holding the foreign ministry.  
 
In contrast, coalition partners may opt for arrangements of coalition governance which put 
greater limits to the policy-making discretion of individual ministries to ensure that policy 
across jurisdictions reflect the preferences of all parties in the coalition (Hallerberg and von 
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Hagen, 1997). To this purpose, coalition governments can rely on a range of ex ante and ex 
post control mechanisms which allow coalition partners to keep tabs on each other. Chief 
among these mechanisms are binding coalition agreements (Timmermans, 2006; Moury, 
2010); divided portfolios in which one or more junior ministers come from a different 
coalition partner than the cabinet minister (Thies, 2001; Verzichelli, 2008); the shadowing of 
departments by parliamentary committees which are chaired by other coalition partners than 
the party holding the respective ministry (Martin and Vanberg, 2004; Carroll and Cox, 2012); 
as well as high-level coalition committees and cross-departmental policy making bodies in 
which all coalition partners are equally represented (Kaarbo, 1996). Also, the policy 
discretion of the foreign ministry may be constrained by the powers and competences of the 
Prime Minister in foreign affairs. In any case, the foreign policy of coalition governments 
which are marked by strong intra-coalition checks and balances in foreign affairs should 
reflect not so much the ideal points of single coalition parties as compromises between the 
coalition partners and thus resemble patterns of cabinet government. 
 
What is important to note, moreover, is that the two dimensions of coalition arrangements are 
interrelated. Specifically, the weight attached to the foreign ministry in the portfolio 
allocation process will partly depend on the discretion and independent authority over foreign 
policy that come with it. The more this discretion and authority can be constrained by other 
coalition partners, the less parties will value the department at the coalition formation stage 
(Bäck et al, 2011). One implication of this is that senior coalition partners will more likely be 
prepared to leave the foreign ministry to a junior partner, the closer the policy-making 
authority of this portfolio is being circumscribed. Indeed, strong coalition mechanisms for 
controlling and monitoring the foreign ministry may well be a precondition for the senior 
partner to agree to putting a junior partner in charge of the department. In contrast, if holding 
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the foreign ministry does involve far-reaching powers to steer coalition foreign policy, the 
senior coalition partner should be more likely to bring to bear its relative size in the coalition 
formation game to secure the portfolio for itself. 
 
 
TYPES OF COALITION ARRANGEMENTS AND THE MAKING OF COALITION 
FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Bringing the two dimensions of coalition set-ups together yields four types of coalition 
arrangements for the making of foreign policy. These types differ as to which coalition 
partner – the senior partner or a junior partner – has been allocated the foreign ministry and 
regarding the extent of policy discretion this ministry has (see Table 1). Each of the types, 
moreover, should come with predictable implications for the process of coalition foreign 
policy making and ultimately for the foreign policy outputs of coalition governments. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first type of coalition arrangements has a senior partner-led foreign ministry and is 
marked by patterns of ministerial government. Coalition foreign policy making will be 
dominated by the senior partner, with little or no meaningful junior partner influence. Under 
such an arrangement, coalition foreign policy should display no significant differences 
compared to a counterfactual single party government of the senior partner. In particular, the 
decision-making process in this type of coalition should not systematically be more 
conflictual or prone to deadlock (Hagan et al, 2001) than in single-party governments. Since 
the authority to make foreign policy is concentrated in the senior partner, moreover, the 
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responsibility for foreign policy decisions can be clearly attributed so that this type of 
coalition government will not add to any diffusion of accountability. Also, there will be little 
scope for junior partners to use positions of authority in the foreign policy executive to 
‘hijack’ coalition foreign policy. Therefore, two causal mechanisms – the diffusion and the 
‘hijacking’ arguments – which are expected to drive coalitions to more extreme foreign 
policies (Beasley and Kaarbo, 2014) should not be effective in this type of arrangement. 
 
The second type, in turn, is also characterised by ministerial government but has a junior 
partner in charge of the foreign ministry. This arrangement is often implicitly or explicitly 
assumed in existing research on coalition foreign policy and supports the expectation of more 
extreme foreign policies of coalition governments. Coalition foreign policy will reflect, in 
particular, the preferences and priorities of the junior partner which can use its position at the 
top of the foreign office to effectively control and shape the foreign policy making process in 
the coalition. While this set-up should not be more vulnerable to deadlock than the first type, 
it opens up opportunities for committed junior partners to ‘hijack’ coalition foreign policy 
and to push it towards the extremes. What is more, the allocation of the foreign ministry to a 
junior partner suggests that this party takes a particular interest in foreign affairs and will 
likely employ its control of the ministry to develop a high public profile in this field. 
Specifically, junior partners should be expected to invest a substantial part of its limited 
political resources to develop a reputation in the public mind of ‘owning’ coalition foreign 
policy and of cultivating a profile as a distinct and influential political force in the coalition. 
A case in point for these patterns is the recent coalition government in Germany (2009–2013) 
between the Christian Democrats and their Liberal junior partner, in which the junior partner 
held the foreign ministry and was subsequently able to capture coalition foreign policy on 
issues such as the demand for a withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany or the 
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German abstention on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya in March 2011 
(Oppermann and Brummer, 2014). 
 
Moving on to the third type, this coalition arrangement combines senior partner control of the 
foreign ministry with powerful checks and balances of junior coalition partners. Specifically, 
junior partners have available strong mechanisms to control and constrain the policy 
discretion of the senior partner in charge of the ministry. In this set-up, coalition foreign 
policy making is marked by the need to balance potentially competing interests of different 
coalition partners and therefore tends to be more conflictual than in the first two types. To the 
extent that junior partners have independent veto powers over foreign policy, this 
arrangement should also be more susceptible to deadlock (Hagan et al, 2001). At the same 
time, the influence of junior partners should not work towards more extreme and high-
commitment foreign policies but lead to more moderate and low-commitment coalition 
foreign policy. Rather than ‘hijacking’ coalition foreign policy, the role of junior partners in 
foreign policy making is more behind the scenes and primarily works to restrict the ability of 
the senior partner to implement its foreign policy agenda in full. Junior partners will also 
keep a lower profile in foreign affairs and will be less likely to put foreign policy at the centre 
of its public political profile. An exemplar case for this pattern is the 2010–2015 
Conservatives-Liberal Democrats coalition government in the UK, in which the Liberal 
Democrats as the junior coalition partner did not hold the foreign ministry (or any other 
department in the foreign policy executive) but could rely on multiple mechanisms to 
‘coalitionise’ foreign policy making, in particular during the early years of the coalition. 
These mechanisms were indeed instrumental in enabling the Liberal Democrats to prevent 
their senior party from taking more extreme foreign policy choices on issues such as the 
renewal of the British nuclear deterrent or European policy (Oppermann and Brummer, 2014). 
12 
 
 
Finally, the fourth type of coalition set-up has a junior coalition partner in charge of the 
foreign ministry as well as strong mechanisms for cabinet government. Under this 
arrangement, the ability of the junior partner to use its control of the foreign ministry to 
‘hijack’ coalition foreign policy and to drive the foreign policy agenda of the coalition will be 
severely constrained by the senior partner. Given its position as the largest coalition party and 
as the party holding the Prime Ministership, the senior partner will be particularly powerful in 
making use of existing control mechanisms to reign in the junior partner holding the foreign 
ministry. In consequence, there will likely be a greater mismatch between leading the foreign 
ministry and being able to shape coalition foreign policy in practice than under the other 
types of coalition set-ups. This may become a source of junior partner disaffection and open 
up a significant potential for intra-coalition conflict in foreign policy making. Moreover, 
while the senior coalition partner is very powerful in constraining the foreign policy leeway 
of the junior partner at the head of the foreign ministry, it cannot use the resources of the 
ministry to proactively shape and lead coalition foreign policy itself. The fourth type of 
coalition arrangement will thus be particularly susceptible to deadlock. 
 
The potential of the suggested typology in guiding comparative empirical research is fourfold. 
First, it can be used to categorise current and historical cases of coalition governments and 
advance our understanding of which coalition arrangements for making foreign policy are 
most common. Specifically, this promises to uncover within-country and cross-country 
patterns in coalition set-ups. To that purpose, the typology can help map coalition 
governments both in European parliamentary democracies and beyond, including in the 
Global South. Second, the typology can further research into the allocation of foreign 
ministries in coalition governments. Specifically, it can be used to identify critical cases for 
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exploring possible trade-offs between the allocation of the foreign ministry and its policy 
discretion at the coalition formation stage. Third, the typology offers a starting point for 
research to establish if and to what extent the hypothesised implications of the different types 
of coalition arrangements for processes of coalition foreign policy making hold empirically. 
Not least, such research promises to yield more differentiated insights into the foreign policy 
outputs of coalition governments. Fourth and most broadly, the typology might encourage 
studies to explore if the different types of coalition arrangements are specific to foreign 
policy or if they are applicable to other portfolios as well. Such research would make a 
welcome contribution to bringing together scholarship on coalition governance in public and 
foreign policy. 
 
THE PROBLEMS AND PROMISE OF FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN 
COALITION GOVERNMENTS 
 
When compared to single party governments, coalition governments are often associated with 
negative processes and outcomes that hamper the quality of governance. Coalition 
governments are depicted as arrangements in which political deadlock, conflict, hijacking by 
junior parties (Kaarbo 1996), inefficiency (Bejar, Mukherjee and Moore, 2011) and low 
accountability (Strøm, Müller and Smith, 2010; Kisangani and Pickering, 2011) are more 
common than in single party governments. For example, Bejar, Mukherjee and Moore (2011) 
found that due to their shorter duration, coalition governments are more costly than single-
party governments and therefore less efficient. Also, accountability is said to be lower in 
coalition governments, because monitoring and controlling multiparty cabinets is more 
difficult for the parliamentary majority than in case of single party cabinets (Strøm, Müller 
and Smith, 2010). 
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With a view to foreign policy, however, such general assessments about coalition government 
need to be qualified. While Kaarbo’s (2012) in-depth case studies of coalition foreign policy 
in the Netherlands, Turkey and Japan do indeed display many features of poor decision-
making often associated with coalition governments, they also point to numerous cases of 
good, creative and decisive governance, for example regarding the prevention of premature 
closure in scrutinising alternative courses of action. Specifically, the typology of coalition 
arrangements developed above would suggest that the risks and negative characteristics often 
attributed to coalition foreign policy depend on the type of coalition in question. 
 
To start with, foreign policy making in coalition governments resembling the first type should 
not be considered problematic, since there is no significant difference to single party 
governments when it comes to the process of foreign policy making. The second, third and 
fourth types, in contrast, are problematic in terms of possible deadlock or hijacking. However, 
these risks differ depending on the particular type of coalition arrangement. In the second 
type the main concern is hijacking, whereas the third and in particular the fourth type are 
primarily vulnerable to deadlock. 
 
Discussing these types of coalition arrangements only in terms of risk, however, does not do 
justice to the positive characteristics of coalition government. For example, Huber and Powell 
(1994) conclude that the congruence between citizens (voters) and policy makers is often 
higher in coalition governments than in single-party governments. Also, coalitions are 
associated with the prevention of societal conflict. This is well illustrated by Lijphart’s (1977) 
concepts of consociational democracy and consensus democracy (1999). Deeply divided 
societies can still have a stable political regime if the political elites representing the different 
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segments of society are prepared to cooperate. Consociationalist theory posits that such 
cooperation is facilitated by grand, inclusive, depoliticised and egalitarian coalitions 
(Andeweg, 2008). Not least, the promise of coalition governments is that they are more 
representative and do better in taking into account a more diverse range of views than single-
party governments (Kaarbo, 2012). There is a trade-off between effectiveness, efficiency, 
coherence and congruence on the one hand and representativeness on the other. A coalition 
government with a junior party holding the ministry of foreign affairs, or a coalition 
government with a senior party in charge of foreign policy, but with little policy discretion, 
might be more conflictual, but at the same time better at representing different groups within 
society. More representative government might be less effective and/or less efficient, but at 
the same time more legitimate. 
 
In addition to these positive characteristics, it is wrong to assume that coalition governments 
cannot solve problems like hijacking or deadlock in foreign policy. Coalition governments 
are often embedded in institutional arrangements that prevent and mitigate conflict between 
the coalition partners. Coalition agreements, for example, are useful tools to prevent conflict 
between coalition partners, because they are ‘pre-commitments, by which the negotiating 
parties ‘bind themselves to the mast’’ (Müller and Strøm, 2008). Coalitions also have conflict 
management mechanisms at their disposal. Timmermans and Moury (2006) show that at least 
in the case of recent Dutch and Belgium coalition governments, conflict management 
mechanisms were institutionalised and explain the stability of coalition governments in both 
countries. 
 
Arguably, successful conflict management and achieving consensus are more likely in 
foreign policy making processes than in domestic policy making. This is because the 
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particular domain of foreign policy adds to the coherence of coalition politics. For example, 
neorealist theorising would suggest that international systemic effects discipline coalition 
governments, because domestic issues and party political considerations are secondary to 
exogenous circumstances in foreign policy making. In this view, conflict between coalition 
partners is prevented or mitigated, because national security considerations stimulate the 
coalition government to set aside intra-coalitional differences. Moravcsik (1997) gives 
similar importance to exogenous factors (but from a liberal point of view) when he argues 
that the interdependence of state preferences constrains the foreign policy of any government.  
 
At the other side of the spectrum, social constructivists and role theorists emphasise the 
importance of culture and identity in explaining foreign policy making (Holsti, 1970; 
Duffield, 1998; Hopf, 2002). Exogenous factors and role conceptions do not make party 
politics within a coalition irrelevant, but they help preventing deadlock and conflict. A strong 
national role conception can stimulate consensus in spite of an ideologically segmented 
coalition government.  
 
Finally, intra-coalition consensus in foreign policy making may simply result from the 
survival instincts of self-interested coalition governments. For example, there might be strong 
domestic political pressures to ‘do something’ in reaction to an international humanitarian 
crisis. Such pressures can facilitate unity between the coalition partners, irrespective of their 
party political differences, if the government wants to prevent being ‘punished’ by the 
electorate (Pohl, van Willigen and van Vonno, 2015). It is fair to conclude, therefore, that 
coalition governments are after all “not as bad as they are often portrayed” (Kaarbo, 2012: 
244) in making foreign policy. 
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RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
The above discussion points to several avenues for future research. Regarding portfolio 
allocation, virtually no work has specifically investigated the key drivers behind the 
allocation of foreign ministries at the coalition formation stage. Thus, future research should 
develop hypotheses to explain under which conditions the foreign ministry is likely go to a 
senior or junior coalition partner. As far as the making of foreign policy is concerned, one 
could look into the extent, and associated mechanisms, to which a junior party who is in 
charge of the foreign ministry is able to circumvent the constraints imposed by the senior 
coalition party on the discretion and independence of that ministry. Relatedly, additional 
research is required probing into the mechanisms employed by coalition governments to 
overcome deadlock or hijacking by junior parties in foreign policy making. More attention 
needs also to be put on how different coalition arrangements affect other intra-coalition 
dynamics in foreign policy decision-making, such as logrolling or diffusing accountability 
(see also the contribution to this symposium by Oktay and Beasley). 
 
Regarding the different types of coalition arrangements in foreign policy, one could explore, 
for instance, whether and how factionalism within the senior party can be exploited by junior 
parties. For example, internal divisions within senior parties leading the foreign ministry 
might enable junior parties to constrain their senior partners even under conditions of 
ministerial government. This would render type 1 more similar to type 3 and thus increase the 
likelihood of deadlock under the first type of coalition arrangements. Finally, while we have 
argued above that national role conceptions could possibly exert a mitigating effect on the 
emergence of intra-coalition conflict over foreign policy, members of a coalition might as 
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well disagree over the appropriate role conception to be pursued by their country in the first 
place (Brummer and Thies, 2015). Future research could thus examine the extent to which 
national role conceptions are a source of intra-coalition agreement or conflict over foreign 
policy. In any case, pursuing some of these lines of inquiry appear to hold significant promise 
in furthering our understanding of coalition governance in foreign policy. 
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Table 1: Types of Coalition Arrangements for Foreign Policy 
 Which coalition partner holds the foreign ministry? 
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 SENIOR PARTNER JUNIOR PARTNER 
MINISTERIAL  
GOVERNMENT 
Type 1: Minimal junior partner 
influence 
Little or no difference to single-
party government 
Type 2: ‘Issue ownership’ and 
‘hijacking’ of junior partner 
More extreme coalition foreign 
policy 
CABINET  
GOVERNMENT 
Type 3: Constraining influence 
of junior partner on coalition 
foreign policy  
More moderate coalition 
foreign policy 
Type 4: Only limited scope for 
junior partner ‘issue ownership’ 
and ‘hijacking’  
Coalition foreign policy 
particularly susceptible to 
deadlock 
 
 
